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Abstract
This Essay examines the role of multinational corporations in protecting human rights around
the globe. Part I analyzes the conduct of corporations, describes examples of corporations’ in-
volvement in human rights violations, and discusses the merits of greater responsibility of corpo-
rations. Part II suggests that the level of responsibility for a multinational corporation depends on
the proximity of the corporation’s operations to human rights violations, in combination with the
seriousness of the violations, and proposes five gradations of responsibility. This Essay concludes
that the evolving nature of the global economy is producing a shift in responsibilities from govern-
ment to the private sector, particularly multinational corporations, and that those responsibilities
may include the power and duty to safeguard human rights.
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INTRODUCTION
The closing years of the twentieth century may be witnessing
the stirrings of a second human rights revolution.
In the first revolution, the human rights conduct of govern-
ments became a concern of international law. Beginning in
1945 with the U.N. Charter' and the Nuremberg trials,2 it over-
threw the traditional doctrine that human rights, with few excep-
tions, lay within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of sovereign
states.' From those revolutionary beginnings in 1945, interna-
tional law has steadily expanded both the responsibilities of gov-
ernments to respect human rights and the sanctions for govern-
ment officials who violate them.4
Yet, even as this first revolution continues to unfold, a sec-
ond may be underway involving the human rights responsibili-
ties, not of governments, but of private multinational corpora-
tions, which in many ways can be more powerful than most na-
tional governments. Just as governments accepted international
human rights responsibilities in the U.N. Charter and other trea-
* Executive Director, International Human Rights Law Institute, and Jeanne and
Joseph Sullivan Program for Human Rights in the Americas, DePaul University College
of Law. This Essay is based on an Address given by the Author to the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations, February 7, 1996. The Author acknowledges the valuable re-
search assistance of Ms. Evelyn Marsh, J.D. Candidate, 1997, DePaul University.
1. U.N. CHARTER. Article 1(3) of the Charter provides that one purpose of the
United Nations is to "achieve international cooperation in... promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights." Id. art. 1(3). Under Article 55(c) the United Nations
commits to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights." Id. art
55(c). Under Article 56 all Member States pledge "to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with" the United Nations for that purpose. Id. art. 56.
2. See generally The Nuremberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946) ("[T]he very
essence of the [Nuremberg] Charter is that individuals have international duties which
transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state.").
3. See generally Louis Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Indi-
viduals Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. REv. 1, 1-9 (1982).
4. See id. at 9-64; see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 Oct.
1995, Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, reprinted in 16 HUM. RTs. L.J. 426 (1995), Decision
on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction.
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ties, multinational corporations are beginning to accept interna-
tional human rights responsibilities in the form of self-imposed
codes of conduct and other private initiatives.
If this trend portends the beginning of a second human
rights revolution, its normative outcome remains unclear. There
is not yet boardroom consensus on the responsibility, if any, of
multinational corporations with regard to serious human rights
violations in countries where they do business.
This Essay examines the role of multinational corporations
in protecting human rights around the globe. Part I analyzes the
conduct of corporations, describes examples of corporations' in-
volvement in human rights violations, and discusses the merits of
greater responsibility of corporations. Part II suggests that the
level of responsibility for a multinational corporation depends
on the proximity of the corporation's operations to human
rights violations, in combination with the seriousness of the vio-
lations, and proposes five gradations of responsibility. This Essay
concludes that the evolving nature of the global economy is pro-
ducing a shift in responsibilities from government to the private
sector, particularly multinational corporations, and that those re-
sponsibilities may include the power and duty to safeguard
human rights.
I. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
A. Case Studies: Royal Dutch Shell and The Gap
Two recent examples, drawn from opposite ends of the
spectrum of corporate social responsibility, illustrate the wide
range of current practice.
1. Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria
Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Shell ("Shell") apparently
made no serious effort to keep Nigeria's military regime from
executing author Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other environmental
activists in November 1995. 5
For years, Saro-Wiwa led an activist group of the Ogoni eth-
nic minority in the Niger River Delta. The Ogoni claimed that
Shell drilling and pipelines had polluted their waters and
5. Shell Game in Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at 14.
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poisoned their lands, ruining not only their environment but
their livelihoods, which depended on fishing and farming.6 The
Ogoni also claimed that they were not benefitting from this ex-
ploitation of their land. Although Shell purports to have sup-
ported dozens of community projects in Ogoniland and recently
boosted its budget for environmental improvements to over
US$100 million,7 the Ogoni say that most of the oil money that
stayed in Nigeria went into the pockets of corrupt military of-
ficers.
In the early 1990's, members of Saro-Wiwa's ethnic activist
group allegedly sabotaged Shell's equipment, to the point where
Shell ceased operations in Ogoniland in 1993.8 To preserve its
investment. in Nigeria, Shell called upon the local authorities,
which would normally seem an appropriate step under these cir-
cumstances, to protect their property. Nigeria is ruled, however,
by a corrupt, repressive, military regime, currently headed by
General Sani Abacha.9 For example, its most recent election, in
1993, resulted in the imprisonment of the civilian winner.10
According to a New York Times investigation, Shell called in
the Nigerian military's hit squad, known locally as the "kill-and-
go mob," against the Ogoni. 11 The results were foreseeable, par-
ticularly since several prior Shell requests for similar "help" had
led to murders and massacres of Ogoni. 12 According to Dr.
Owens Wiwa, brother of Ken Saro-Wiwa, security forces killed
some 2000 Ogoni and razed thirty villages. 13
During these operations Shell did not stand idly by, but
6. Paul Lewis, Nigeria's Deadly Oil War: Shell Defends its Record, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
1996, at Al.
7. Shell Admits Causing Pollution in Nigeria, Announces Survey Plan, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Feb. 3,1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFPFR File.
8. John Darnton, Shell Makes a Big Oil Discovery off Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1996, at A8.
9. See generally, e.g., U.S. DEP'T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR
1994, S. REP. No. 12, 104th Cong. 1st Sess., 188-200 (1995); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996, at 34-40 (1995) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996].
10. U.S. DEP'T STATE, supra note 9, at 189, 195.
11. Lewis, supra note 6, at Al, A4.
12. See Karl Maier, Nigerian Dissident Faces Death Penalty, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 29,
1995, World 12; Andy Rowell, Sleeping With the Enemy, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 23, 1996,
World 23.
13. Lewis, supra note 6, at A4; Dr. Owens Wiwa, Presentation at the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation in Chicago (Feb. 9, 1996) (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
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helped transport troops. As the military attacked Ogoni villages,
Dr. Wiwa observed Shell helicopters overhead. His injured pa-
tients told him the soldiers came in Shell boats.14 The Times in-
vestigation confirms that Shell not only transported, but even
paid salary bonuses to troops participating in the repression.' 5
According to the Times, Shell officials "said it was not unusual for
companies seeking protection to pay transportation costs and
salary supplements for troops living outside their barracks.' 6
When these efforts failed to quell the unrest, the Nigerian re-
gime had Mr. Saro-Wiwa and several other activists arrested,
jailed, and prosecuted on murder charges. British Prime Minis-
terJohn Major later called the trial "fraudulent."17
During the trial, at least two prosecution witnesses .recanted
their testimony, claiming that they had been bribed. One key
witness swore in an affidavit that he had been promised Shell
contracts and money "from Shell and government" to incrimi-
nate Saro-Wiwa. The witness claimed that Shell representatives
were present when the offer was made, although Shell denies
this charge.18
Dr. Wiwa claims that he met secretly with Shell's top official
in Nigeria, and asked the official to use his influence to stop the
prosecution. According to Dr. Wiwa, the official replied,
"[t]hat's difficult, but not impossible," provided the Ogoni halt
their international campaign. Shell admits the meeting, but de-
nies the offer.'"
As the trial unfolded and its unfairness became apparent,
international protests mounted,20 but Shell, publicly at least, was
14. Dr. Owens Wiwa, supra note 13.
15. Paul Lewis, Blood and Oil: A Special Report: After Nigeria Represses, Shell Defends it
Record, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996, at Al.
16. Lewis, supra note 6, at A4.
17. Ian Black et al., Nigeria Defies World with Writer's Judicial Murder', THE GuARDLiAN,
November 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, Europe library, GUARDN File.
18. Ade Obisesan, Saro-Wiwa defence accuses Shell of trying to bribe witness, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFPFR file; Shell Denies
Foul Play in Nigerian Murder Trial, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File.
19. Bob Herbert, Unholy Alliance in Nigeria, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1996, at Al5; Dr.
Owens Wiwa, supra note 13.
20. See generally, e.g., Prepared Testimony of Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human
Rights Watch, Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs,
FED. NEws SERV., July 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW file.
The presence on the tribunal of... an active member of the armed forces
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silent. When the trial ended in October 1995, Saro-Wiwa and his
co-accused were sentenced to death. Protests poured in from
the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, the
U.S. and British Governments, South Africa's Nelson Mandela,
and countless others.2 1
But again, Shell, whose joint venture with Nigeria's state oil
company supplied significant revenue for General Abacha's re-
gime, did not protest, at least not publicly. 22 "It is not for a com-
mercial organization," the company explained, "to interfere with
the legal processes of a sovereign state such as Nigeria.123
Only after the General's Military Council confirmed the
death sentences of Mr. Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues did Shell's
Chairman send a last-minute facsimile transmission "requesting
clemency on humanitarian grounds.124 But this gesture was too
little, too late, for Ken Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues were
hanged a few days later.25 Soon thereafter, Shell announced
that it would go ahead with a US$4 billion joint venture natural
gas plant in Nigeria, with its partner being General Abacha's
state oil company.2 6
Several key facts remain in dispute regarding Shell's involve-
ment in the violation of human rights in Nigeria. Enough has
been substantiated and admitted, however, to raise questions of
Shell's possible responsibility for violations of human rights,
under the command of General Abacha, renders the tribunal's independence
particularly questionable .... The tribunal's judgment is not subject to review
by a higher court.... The eight-month delay in filing charges .... in conjunc-
tion with the procedural irregularities that characterize the trial, strongly sug-
gest that the charges are politically motivated.
Id.
21. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Commission Appeal to Nigerian military, DEUTSCHE
PRESsE-AGENTUR, Nov. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFPFR file; John
Sweeney & Cameron Duodu, Nigeria? Business as Usual with the General, Chaps, THE OB-
SERVER, Nov. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
22. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria operates Nigeria's largest
joint venture, on behalf of the state-owned company which owns 55%, Shell which owns
30%, and two other companies which own 10% and 5%, respectively. Tunde Obadina,
Shell Denies Exploitation Charge in Nigeria, REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., April 16, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Busfin Library, REUEUB File. See also Lewis, supra note 6, at A4 ("Shell
produces roughly half of Nigeria's oil."); Jeremy Watson, Save Ken Saro-Wiwa, SCOTLAND
ON SUNDAY, Nov. 12, 1995, at 15 (listing Nigerian oil production figures by company).
23. Lewis, supra note 6, at A4.
24. Id.
25. Howard W. French, Nigeria Executes Critic of Regime; Nations Protest, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1995, at Al.
26. Rowell, supra note 12.
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both in the military operations and at the trial. At the very least,
it is apparent that Shell would not accept any responsibility to-
ward human rights violations by its business partners.
2. The Gap in El Salvador
During 1995, the same year as the Saro-Wiwa trial, The Gap
demonstrated a more positive approach to human rights. Like
others in its industry, this trendy retailer had recently adopted
human rights standards for contractors from whom it buys ap-
parel. 7 In early 1995, labor and religious groups mounted a
campaign to protest alleged sweatshop conditions at one of The
Gap's contractors in El Salvador.28
The campaign attracted the interest of columnist Bob Her-
bert of the New York Times. In a series of columns,29 Herbert
detailed how young women at the Salvadoran plant were paid
fifty-six cents an hour, which was less than one fifth of minimum
cost of living requirements. Herbert also described how the wo-
men were forced to work eighteen hours a day and to get tickets
from supervisors to go to the bathroom. Many, he said, were
fired when they tried to form a union.
The Gap responded to these articles immediately by sus-
pending orders from the contractor involved and by sending in-
vestigators, including its corporate vice president, to El Salvador.
Initially, The Gap reported that it was unable to corroborate the
allegations." After several months of continued adverse public-
ity, however, and after Salvadoran human rights agencies con-
firmed the allegations,3 1 The Gap relented. Confronted by ex-
treme and contradictory allegations, The Gap refused to do busi-
ness with the contractor involved until The Gap's guidelines
were clearly met. The Gap also refused to contract at all in El
27. THE GAP, SOURCING PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, attached to Letter from Stan-
ley P. Raggio, Senior Vice President, Sourcing and Logistics, The GAP Inc., to Chicago
Religious Leadership Network (Nov. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Raggio] (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
28. Bob Herbert, In America: A Sweatshop Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1995, at A39.
29. Bob Herbert, In America: Children of the Dark Ages, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995,
A25; Bob Herbert, In America: Sweatshop Beneficiaries, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1995, at A13;
Bob Herbert, In America: Not a Living Wage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at A17; Bob Her-
bert, In America: In Deep Denial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at A33.
30. In Deep Denial, supra note 29, at A33.
31. See Not a Living Wage, supra note 29, at A17; In Deep Denia, supra note 29, at
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Salvador until the Government proved capable of investigating
and resolving labor disputes fairly. - 2
After further discussions with labor and religious groups,
The Gap then made a commitment to take an unusual step, ex-
ploring an independent monitoring system for human rights vio-
lations by its contractors."3 In March 1996, The Gap reached
agreement with its Salvadoran contractor that several local reli-
gious, human rights, and labor groups would independently
monitor compliance with The Gap's guidelines in El Salvador. 4
At the same time, The Gap neared completion of a re-write of its
guidelines, to convert them into a more detailed, specific code
of conduct.3 5
Shell in Nigeria and The Gap in El Salvador are, admittedly,
not entirely comparable case studies. After all, Shell refused to
accept any responsibility for human rights violations committed
by its powerful joint venturer partners, while The Gap took deci-
sive action against a much smaller Salvadoran contractor. Yet,
even acknowledging these and other factual differences, the two
cases suggest sharply differing views of corporate social responsi-
bility toward human rights violations.
B. The Development of Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Corporations
1. The United Nations, the Organization for Economic
Development, and the International Labor
Organization
The divergence of views exemplified by The Gap and Shell
is not new or unique. For a decade, beginning in the mid-
1970's, an ideologically divided United Nations tried and failed
to develop a code of conduct for multinational enterprises.36 In
32. Raggio, supra note 27.
33. See Stuart Silverstein, Labor Dept. Adds GAP Inc. to "Good Guy" Retailer List, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1995, at D2; Bob Herbert, Righting a Wrong, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 23,
1995, at B6; Journal of Commerce, GAP Pressures Suppliers to Improve Conditions, BUFFALO
NEwS, Dec. 25, 1995, at B9.
34. Revised Resolution Declaration, March 22, 1996, signed by representatives of
Mandarin International, the Archdiocese of San Salvador, the Human Rights Institute
of the University of Central America, Centra (a labor organization), and the Mandarin
Workers' Union (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
35. Interview with Dotti Hatcher, Director, Sourcing & Trade Compliance, The
Gap, in Chicago (April 15, 1996).
36. See generally Seymour Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of
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the mid-1970's, guidelines for multinationals were issued by two
more cohesive organizations, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development 7 ("OECD"), which consists of
twenty-six relatively affluent nations, and the International Labor
Organization3" ("ILO"), whose 159 member nations have a tradi-
tion of pursuing consensus between business and labor.
Yet the OECD and ILO guidelines were limited and broke
little new ground, mostly reaffirming the longstanding rights of
workers to organize unions," to bargain collectively,4 ° and to
non-discriminatory employment.41
2. South Africa: The Sullivan Principles
During the 1970's and 1980's, there was one striking experi-
ment in corporate codes of conduct for human rights: The Sulli-
van Principles for South Africa.4" Developed by Reverend Leon
Sullivan, a General Motors board member, these principles were
initially adopted in 1977 by twelve U.S. firms, including General
Motors. By 1986, approximately 200 of the 260 U.S. corpora-
tions doing business in South Africa had adopted the Sullivan
Principles.4"
Although the Sullivan Principles were limited to protecting
human rights in one country, the firms that took part adopted
unprecedented, far-reaching commitments to corporate social
responsibility toward human rights violations, spurred by a de-
sire to deflect growing calls for divestment from that country.
"Sullivan firms" committed themselves not only to racially non-
discriminatory employment," but also to pay fair wages well
Conduct: A Study of the Relationship Between International Legal Cooperation and Economic
Development, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1275 (1995).
37. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (1976), 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976) [hereinafter OECD].
38. International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Con-
cerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978) [here-
inafter ILO].
39. OECD, supra note 37, art. 7(b)(1); ILO, supra note 38, art. 41.
40. OECD, supra note 37, art. 7(b)(1); ILO, supra note 38, arts. 48-55.
41. OECD, supra note 37, art. 7(b); ILO, supra note 38, arts. 21-23.
42. The Sullivan Statement of Principles (4th Amplification), November 8, 1984,
24 I.L.M. 1464 (1985) [hereinafter Sullivan Principles].
43. Patricia Arnold & Theresa Hammond, The Role of Accounting in Ideological Con-
flict: Lessons from the South African Divestment Movement, 19 Accr., ORGANIZATIONS, AND
Soc. 111, 116 (1994).
44. Sullivan Principles, supra note 42, Principle II.
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above the minimum cost of living,45 to provide managerial train-
ing programs for blacks and other non-whites, 46 to provide their
workers supportive services for housing, health care, transporta-
tion and recreation,47 and to use corporate influence to help
end apartheid in South Africa.48 Each Sullivan Firm's perform-
ance was subject to outside audit and public reports by Arthur D.
Little.49
One might ask whether events in Nigeria would have turned
out differently had Shell undertaken similar commitments for
the Ogoni. Nevertheless, far-reaching as they were, the Sullivan
Principles failed both in their ostensible goal, to bring down
apartheid, and in their tactical goal, to offer a publicly palatable
alternative to divestment from South Africa. By 1987, even Rev-
erend Sullivan pronounced his principles a failure and disassoci-
ated himself from their further use.5° When apartheid ulti-
mately did fall in South Africa, it fell because of other factors,
such as corporate disinvestment from and government sanctions
against South Africa, and not the Sullivan Principles.
3. Northern Ireland: The MacBride Principles
In the mid-1980's, an experiment similar to the Sullivan
Principles, called the MacBride Principles,5 1 was initiated for
Northern Ireland. The MacBride Principles' purpose differs
from the Sullivan Principles, in that they are not intended to
deflect divestment, for which there has been no serious support,
but instead to secure equal treatment for Catholic workers in
Protestant-majority Northern Ireland. The scope of the Mac-
Bride Principles is more limited, focusing on non-discrimina-
tion, without mandating higher wages or additional social serv-
ices.
"MacBride firms" do, however, make one unusual commit-
ment with potential applications elsewhere, which is to make rea-
sonable, good faith efforts to protect the personal safety of their
workers not only at the workplace, but while travelling to and
45. Id. Principle III.
46. Id. Principle V.
47. Id. Principle VI.
48. Id.
49. Arnold & Hammond, supra note 43, at 114.
50. Id. at 118.
51. IRISH NATIONAL CAUCUS, THE MAcBRIDE PRINCIPLES (1984).
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from work.52
As of February 1995, thirty-two of the eighty publicly traded
U.S. firms operating in Northern Ireland had signed on to the
MacBride Principles.53 Sixteen states and more than forty cities
have enacted MacBride Principles laws.54
C. Corporate Human Rights Policies and Codes of Conduct
Granted, the Sullivan and MacBride Principles are unique
cases because they relate to particular troubled nations, each
with strong political constituencies in the United States. Yet,
those endeavors raise a question of principle: If multinationals
can undertake such proactive commitments in South Africa and
Northern Ireland, how can they deny similar social responsibili-
ties in other countries with serious human rights problems?
1. Firms with Global Codes and Policies
A growing number of firms have answered that question by
adopting "global" human rights codes of conduct and policies
for their operations and contractors. Spurred largely by media
revelations of forced labor in China and child labor in Southeast
Asia in the early 1990's, 55 many major retailers and apparel and
footwear firms have adopted policies and codes that address
forced labor, child labor, labor organizing and bargaining, non-
discrimination, worker health and safety, and in some cases min-
imum wage, and maximum hour guidelines.56
52. Id. art. 2.
53. Id.
54. Conor O'Clery, US Funds for Ireland Must Meet MacBride Principles, IRISH TIMES,
Jan. 3,1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
55. See, e.g., Ethical Shopping: Human Rights, THE ECONOMIST, June 3, 1995, at 58.
Levi Strauss introduced new terms of engagement after it was discovered in 1992 to be
buying clothes from underpaid and mistreated workers in Saipan. Id. Wal-Mart took
similar steps after the National Broadcasting Company, in 1993, showed children in a
Bangladeshi factory making Wal-Mart shirts. Id. Doug Cogan, Worker Standards for Non-
U.S.Suppliers, INVESTOR RESP. RES. CENT., Mar. 2, 1995, at 7 [hereinafter IRRC].
56. See, e.g., Diane Orentlicher & Timothy Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The
Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66, 125
(1993) ("Human Rights Provisions of Levi Strauss & Co.'s 'Business Partner Terms of
Engagement' "); Id. at 127 ("Reebok International Ltd.'s 'Human Rights Production
Standards' "); Id. at 129 ("Human Rights Provisions of Phillips-Van Heusen Policy 'A
Shared Commitment: Requirements for Suppliers, Contractors, Business Partners' ");
Bruce Landay, One American Corporation's Attempt to Define and Play a Role in the Global
Environment: Some Observations on the Standards for Social Responsibility of the Timberland
Company, 1994 ASIL PROC. 284 (1994) [hereinafter Timberland Policy].
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The list of clothiers with such policies and codes now in-
cludes, for example: Levi Strauss, Sears, J.C. Penney, Wal-Mart,
Phillips-Van Heusen, and The Gap. Footwear giants Nike,
Reebok, and Timberland have also adopted codes.58 At least
thirty-six member firms of the Athletic Footwear Association,
representing ninety percent of industry sales, have signed on to
an industry code.59 And in 1995, Starbucks became the first pub-
licly traded firm in agricultural imports, coffee beans, to adopt a
code.6 °
Some firms have gone so far as to pull their entire opera-
tions out of countries where human rights are pervasively vio-
lated. Levi Strauss6' and Timberland6" have announced their
departures from China. Furthermore, Levi Strauss, Liz Clai-
borne, Eddie Bauer, and Federated Department Stores, owner of
Macy's, have pulled out of Burma.63
In addition, some eight-hundred firms have formed an asso-
ciation for clearinghouse and consulting purposes, called Busi-
ness for Social Responsibility64 ("BSR"), whose main activities in-
clude a program on "business and human rights." While most
members are small or medium size firms, BSR boasts more than
forty firms with annual gross revenues exceeding US$5 billion.65
BSR's membership includes such heavyweights as AT&T,
Coopers & Lybrand, Dayton Hudson, Federal Express, The Gap,
Home Depot, Honeywell, Polaroid, Revlon, Taco Bell, and
57. See generaUy Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 56, at 67, 106-08; Ethical Shopping,
supra note 55; IRRC, supra note 55.
58. IRRC, supra note 55, at 1, 3.
59. John Duerden, Walking the Walk' on Global Ethics, DIRECTORS & BOARDS (IN-
VESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST INC.), Mar. 22, 1995; ATHLETIC FooTWEAR ASSOCIATION,
STATEMENT OF GUIDEUNES ON PRACTICES OF BUSINESS PARTNERS; COMMITMENT TO GUIDE-
LINES ON PRACTICES OF BUSINESS PARTNERS, Aug. 31, 1993 (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal).
60. Starbucks Asks Foreign Suppliers to Improve Working Conditions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23,
1995, at B4 [hereinafter Improve Working Conditions]; IRRC, supra note 55, at 8.
61. Improve Working Conditions, supra note 60, at B4. According to the National
Labor Committee, however, it is not entirely clear that Levi Strauss has fully left China.
Interview with Charles Kernaghan, National Labor Committee Director (February
1996).
62. Landay, supra note 56.
63. Ethical Shopping, supra note 55.
64. Marian Courtney, A Company with a Social Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994,
§ 13 (NJ ed.) at I
65. Interview with Aron Cramer, Director of Business and Human Rights Program,
Business for Social Responsibility (February 1996).
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Viacom. Notably, BSR's President, Robert Dunn, is former Vice
President of Corporate Affairs for Levi Strauss & Co. 66
While use of human rights codes continues to spread rap-
idly, they have yet to be universally adopted. In a survey of 150
multinationals in retail and other likely industries, BSR found
only about twenty-five with human rights codes.67 Franklin Re-
search and Development, a Boston-based social responsibility in-
vesting firm, believes that fewer than ten percent of U.S.-based
multinationals have such codes.68 Still, the growth in corporate
commitments to human rights, even in the space of a few years,
is impressive.
2. The Clinton Administration's Model Business Principles
The U.S. Government is also involved. In 1994, when U.S.
President Bill Clinton de-linked U.S. trade policy with China
from human rights, he promised to emphasize corporate human
rights codes as an alternative. One year later, in May 1995, the
Administration formally published a set of Model Business Prin-
ciples,69 not only for China, but for all nations.
The Administration's Model Principles are voluntary, with
no provisions for governmental monitoring or enforcement. In-
stead, they encourage "all businesses to adopt and implement
voluntary codes of conduct for doing business around the
world."7" The Model Principles suggest that such corporate
codes cover at least the following: (1) workplace health and
safety; (2) fair employment practices, including bans on child
labor, forced labor and discrimination, and the rights to organ-
ize unions and bargain collectively; (3) environmental protec-
tion; (4) compliance with laws against bribery and corruption;
and (5) a corporate culture that respects free expression and
does not condone political coercion in the workplace, that con-
tributes to communities in which the company operates, and
that values ethical conduct.
The Administration's Model Principles, which reflected
66. BUSINESS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (SAN FRANcisco), PROMOTIONAL MATERIAL
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
67. Cramer, supra note 65.
68. N.M., Saving the Brand Name, MACLAEN'S, Dec. 11, 1995, at 30.
69. Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Voluntary "Model Business Principles" Issued by the
Clinton Administration May 26, 1995, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, May 31, 1995.
70. Id.
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compromises both within the Government and without, were ini-
tially criticized by both human rights and business groups.
Human Rights Watch/Asia, which had lobbied for more hard-
hitting, enforceable measures targeted at China, criticized the
Model Principles as "far too vague and broadly worded to have
any impact on the specific problem they were meant to address:
human rights violations in China."71
The United States Council for International Business, on
the other hand, issued a statement expressing its preference for
the OECD and ILO guidelines of the 1970's that, it claimed, ad-
dressed most of the areas in the Administration's principles.
The OECD and ILO guidelines, it noted, have the advantage of'
being multilateral, thus not putting U.S.-based firms at a compet-
itive disadvantage. And, it added pointedly, the OECD and ILO
follow-up procedures indicate that those organizations cannot
judge the performance of individual companies.72
After these initial criticisms, however, both human rights
and business groups seemed to reconcile themselves to the Ad-
ministration's initiative. Human rights groups seem to regard
the Model Principles as a positive if modest step, while the Ad-
ministration found eight large firms: Boeing, Honeywell, GE,
Westinghouse, Digital Electric, Kodak, Rockwell and Loral, will-
ing to support its Principles "as a useful reference point for fram-
ing the codes of conduct of individual businesses."7
Since May 1995, the Model Principles have not been high
on the Administration's list of priorities. No one in Washington
seems to be monitoring how many firms have actually taken up
the invitation to adopt codes reflecting the Model Principles.
Their implementation has been entrusted to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce. By March 1996, the Commerce Depart-
ment's efforts appear to consist mainly of looking for a place to
put an information clearinghouse, and working on nomination
procedures for the awards it plans to hand out annually to firms
exemplifying the Model Principles.74
One should not that, despite the U.S. Council for Interna.-
71. Press Release, Human Rights Watch/Asia, Mar. 27, 1995.
72. U.S. Council Comments on Business Principles, Bus. WiRE, April 5,1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
73. Paul Lewis, U.S. Provides First Details of its Business Ethics Code, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 1995, at 36.
74. Id.; Interview with Administration Officials (Jan. & Feb., 1996).
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tional Business' stress on the need for multilateralism, the Ad-
ministration does not appear even to have asked the OECD or
ILO to adopt the Model Principles.75 If governmental and inter-
governmental efforts are to be helpful in encouraging multina-
tionals to adopt human rights codes, much remains to be done.
For now, many multinationals are well ahead of the Administra-
tion, the OECD, and the ILO on human rights.
D. Divergent Views on the Need for Greater Corporate Responsibility
Toward Human Rights Violations
1. Activist Groups
Labor, religious, and human rights groups increasingly fo-
cus on the human rights responsibilities of multinationals, and
effectively so. Starbucks adopted its code after dozens of its
stores were leafletted. 76 The Gap adopted independent moni-
toring and strengthened its guidelines after meeting and corre-
sponding with dozens of activists from coast to coast.7 7 '
In September 1995, three groups, the New York-based, in-
terdenominational Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibil-
ity, and similar Canadian and British religious coalitions, pub-
lished and invited comments on a draft set of Principles for Cor-
porate Responsibility: Benchmarks for Measuring Business
Performance. 78 As befits the faith of the authors, they raised the
level of standards above the global corporate codes adopted to
date by multinationals, especially with respect to guidelines for
minimum wages.79
No doubt, then, there is measurable movement, principally
75. On November 9, 1995, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Labor and Exter-
nal Affairs Gare Smith "introduced" the Model Business Principles to the Subcommittee
on Multinational Enterprises of the International Labor Organization. His prepared
statement expressed eagerness for "multinational support for the Model Principles,"
but did not specifically ask the International Labor Organization ("ILO") to adopt
them. GARE SMITH, PREPARED STATEMENT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 4 (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
76. Nancy J. Kim, Companies Issuing Codes of Conduct; Shareholders, Public Both Apply
Pressure, BERGEN REcoRD, Sept. 10, 1995, at Bi; G. Pascal Zachary, Starbucks Asks Foreign
Suppliers to Improve Working Conditions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1995, at B4.
77. Interview with The Gap Officials (December 1995).
78. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Principles for Global Corporate Re-
sponsibility, 24 CORP. EXAMINER 2-4 (Sept. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Interfaith Center].
79. See generally id.
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by multinationals and social activists, but also by governments,
toward firms assuming a significant degree of responsibility with
respect to human rights violations in countries where they do
business.
2. Opposition to the Merits of Corporate Initiatives
But there is also respectable opposition to the assumption
of human rights responsibilities by corporations. Twenty-five
years ago, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman of
the University of Chicago published an article calling corporate
social responsibility a "fundamentally subversive doctrine" in a
free society.80 In Friedman's view, when executives commit cor-
porate funds for social responsibility, they wrongfully usurp the
funds of their shareholders, or possibly of their customers, or
even of their employees. Accordingly, doing public good is the
responsibility of government, not business. In Friedman's view,
"there is only one social responsibility of business - . . . to in-
crease its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the
game."8 '
Whatever one's view of that doctrine, it has two loopholes
that are immediately relevant. First, Friedman espoused his doc-
trine for a free society,82 of which many countries with human
rights violations are not. Nigeria, for example, is not a free soci-
ety. If one insists that only the Government can do good in Ni-
geria, then good simply would go undone.
Second, Friedman also allowed for corporate social respon-
sibility where it is in the financial self-interest of the corporation,
and hence of its stockholders.8" There are many reasons why
voluntary human rights codes may be in a corporation's business
self-interest. In South Africa, for example, apartheid hurt prof-
its. As two scholars noted recently in a British accounting jour-
nal, multinational industry in South Africa "had a special interest
80. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine) at 32, 125.
81. Id. For a more recent version see William Safire, The New Socialism, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 1996, at A13. "What are the primary 'social' responsibilities of a corporation?
To serve its owners by returning a profit and its community by paying taxes; to earn the
allegiance of customers by delivering value; and to provide a secure future for employ-
ees who help it succeed in the marketplace." Id.
82. Friedman, supra note 80, at 125.
83. Id. at 124.
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in labor reforms. The policy of reserving skilled jobs for whites
produced labor shortages; political unrest and strikes in urban
centers cut profit margins; and international economic sanctions
limited access to world markets." 4
More broadly, Citibank's John J. Keller, a specialist on
emerging markets, told the American Society of International
Law in 1994 that, in the long run, educated and healthy workers
are needed for economic development, which in turn increases
business opportunities.85 Even in the short term, underfed
workers may be less productive.
Not only worker rights, but human rights in the broader so-
ciety can be good for business. Longtime business executive and
now Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Joan Spero,
puts it in businesslike terms: "A world community that respects
democracy and human rights will provide a more hospitable cli-
mate for American trade and commerce .... Repression fosters
instability in the long run and puts investment at greater risk of
expropriation or loss."86
Skeptical watchers of the "bottom-line" may remain uncon-
vinced that the promotion of human rights is good for business.
Perhaps the "human rights is good for business" perspective is
true in general or in the long run, critics may say, but what is the
reality for my company, and for my profits next quarter? For
such skeptics, activists would do well to recall that many of to-
day's corporate codes for human rights were adopted following
pressure from consumers, social investors, labor, or the press,
often in combination. Where a corporation's self-interest is not
self-evident, outside assistance may facilitate enlightenment.
3. Ethical Motives for Corporate Codes
While human rights may often comport with even the most
miserly definition of a corporation's self-interest, I would prefer
to make the case for social responsibility at two arguably higher
ethical levels. First, corporations are run not by robots, but by
people, each of whom must confront his or her own conscience.
How many executives would be comfortable letting Ken Saro-
84. Arnold and Hammond, supra note 43, at 116.
85. John J.Keller, Multinational Business and Human Rights, ASIL PROC., 1994, 271,
273-274.
86. Id. at 277.
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Wiwa hang, if they thought they could stop it? How many, if they
witnessed twelve-year olds slaving away long hours in Salvadoran
sweatshops, would simply shrug it off?.
In a 1995 article in Directors & Boards magazine, John Du-
erden, former President of Reebok, put it this way:
As a public company, we have an ethical responsibility to
build value for Reebok's shareholders - but not at all possi-
ble costs. What we seek is harmony between the profit-maxi-
mizing demands of our free-market system and the legitimate
needs of our shareholders, and the needs and aspirations of
the larger world community in which we are all citizens.8 7
The second of the two higher ethical grounds is the proper
role of a multinational corporation in the globalized economy of
the twenty-first century. In the quarter century since Mr. Fried-
man published his article, the World has changed dramatically.
International trade, which accounted for about one tenth of the
U.S. economy in the 1960's, has more than doubled to between
one fifth and one quarter in the 1990's.8
In 1970, there were some seven-thousand multinational cor-
porations in the World. Today, there are more than five times
that number.8 9 A rough estimate by the editors of the Economist
indicates that the three-hundred largest multinationals now con-
trol about one fourth of the World's productive assets.90
As the real power of multinationals has grown, the real
power of national governments has shrunk. Most U.N. Member
States have economies far smaller than the annual revenues of
large multinationals. As Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh
point out in their 1995 book Global Dreams, "Ford's economy is
larger than Saudi Arabia's and Norway's. "91 And the economies
of those two nations, in turn, dwarf those of nearly every nation
in Africa. 92
What this means is that in the current and future global
87. Duerden, supra note 59.
88. RICHARDJ. BARNET &JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS 20 n.4 (1995) (noting
that international trade accounted for 26% in 1990); IRRC, supra note 55, at 4 (noting
that international trade accounted for 22% in 1996).
89. BARNET & CAVANAGH, supra note 88, at 423.
90. Id. (citing A Survey of Multinationals, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 5-6).
91. Id. at 14.
92. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1995, at 192-93, 212 (1995).
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economy, Milton Friedman's theories simply don't work. In
most countries, governments have limited power or resources to
do good. If multinationals turn their backs, exploitation will
continue. Human beings will be left to fall between the twin pil-
lars of hapless governments and careless corporations. That can-
not be why society created the legal fiction of the corporation.
And that cannot be a world that will last.
4. Economic Development and Human Rights
Some may argue that corporations need not take specific
action toward human rights violations, because simply by invest-
ing in a developing economy, they set in motion a chain of
events that leads to a more open society. That is sometimes true.
Development may create a middle class, and it may generate the
revenues that governments need to do public good.9"
But as Human Rights Watch observed in its World Report
1996:
This argument ... ignores the fact that, for every liberalizing
Taiwan there is a Singapore, Indonesia, China or Peru where
economic growth has simply bolstered an Authoritarian re-
gime. Indeed, even if economic development could be corre-
lated in the long-term with improved respect for human
rights - an unproved proposition - that would offer little
solace to those imprisoned and tortured in the meantime. 94
II. HOW RESPONSIBLE SHOULD CORPORATIONS BE?
Having determined that multinationals should undertake
some responsibility toward human rights violations in countries
where they do business, the question then becomes how much is
enough? And how much is feasible, given stiff international
competition? Without pretending to have a complete answer,
93. See Orentlicher & ,Gelatt, supra note 56, at 98-102.
94. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996, supra note 9, at 362. See also
Steven Erlanger, Clinton Administration Study Finds the Chinese Guilty of Widespread Human
Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at A4 (quoting U.S. DEP'T ST., COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HuMAN RIGHTS FOR 1995)
The experience of China in the past few years demonstrates that while eco-
nomic growth, trade and social mobility create an improved standard of living,
they cannot by themselves bring about greater respect for human rights in the
absence of a willingness by political authorities to abide by the fundamental
international norms.
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one might suggest gradations of responsibility, depending on
the circumstances. The closer the violations come to the com-
pany's operations, and the more serious they are, the greater the
firm's responsibility. As an initial hypothesis, one might suggest
the following five levels of responsibility.
1. Treatment of Firm or Contractor Employees
Treatment of firm or contractor employees is one of the
clearest cases for corporate responsibility, as reflected in the
codes of conduct being adopted by increasing numbers of mul-
tinationals. Many important issues must be addressed in draft-
ing and implementing such codes. For example, what grounds
of discrimination are to be prohibited? (Unlike some other
companies, Wal-Mart95 and Timberland 96 bar discrimination
based on disability or sexual orientation.) What age is a child?97
How many hours of work are too many?9" What measures are
most likely to ensure compliance?99
One of the more important questions for the welfare of em-
ployees is wage level. Codes to date adopt a range of approaches
to the determination of wage levels. The Administration's
Model Principles, however, do not even mention wages. Levi
Strauss calls for paying the legal minimum or prevailing local
wage,100 whereas Reebok calls for whichever is higher.101
Neither approach is assured of treating workers with even mini-
95. IRRC, supra note 55, at 8.
96. Landay, supra note 56, at 284.
97. For example, Levi Strauss' Terms of Engagement define a child as less than 14
years of age or younger than the compulsory age to be in school. Orentlicher & Gelatt,
supra note 56, at 125. Reebok's Standards state that child "generally" refers to one less
than 14 years of age, or younger than the compulsory school age, "if that age is higher
than 14." Reebok uses a higher age in countries where the law sets a higher age. Id. at
128. ILO standards set the minimum age for employment at the age of completion of
compulsory schooling and, "in any case," not less than 15, except that underdeveloped
nations, after consultation with the ILO, may initially set the minimum age at 14. Id. at
114 (discussing ILO Convention No. 138, Minimum Age Convention).
98. For example, Levi Strauss will not use contractors who regularly require more
than 60-hour work weeks. Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 56, at 125. Reebok "will
seek" business partners who meet that limit, but in addition "will favor" those who use
48-hour work weeks as their maximum normal requirement. Id. at 127. See also id. at
113-14 (discussing, inter alia, ILO Convention No. 1, Hours of Work (Industry) Convention,
which promulgated general rule of 48-hour maximum).
99. See, e.g., Duerden, supra note 59; IRRC, supra note 55, at 9-10.
100. IRRC, supra note 55, at 7.
101. Id. at 8.
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mal dignity. Some countries have no legal minimum wage, and
others set it below the cost of living. Furthermore, prevailing
local wages may be too low to meet even minimal needs for
human health, nutrition, and development. One ILO study
found that eighty-eight percent of women living near Jakarta,
earning the minimum wage of US$1.80 per day, were malnour-
ished.1 02
Recognizing these deficiencies, the Interfaith Center's Prin-
ciples call for a "sustainable community salary," 10 3 which would
be enough to cover not only basic family needs but a range of
discretionary expenditures as well.
At some point, however, wage increases conflict with a com-
pany's competitive requirements. Nevertheless, there is room
for current corporate codes to improve without seriously threat-
ening corporate competitiveness. After all, recall that Sullivan
Principle multinationals in South Africa committed to, and did,
pay wages significantly above local minimum living costs.104
102. Id. at 14.
103. Interfaith Center, supra note 78, at 5, 9. The three religious sponsors of the
Principles have not yet reached full agreement on a wage standard. The U.S. Interfaith
Center proposes that companies pay "sustainable community wages which enable em-
ployees, especially women, to meet both the basic needs of themselves and their fami-
lies as well as to invest in the ongoing development of sustainability in local communi-
ties through the use of discretionary income." Id. principle 3.2.P.3, at 9 (regular type).
This includes "enough discretionary income for a worker to participate in the support
of the development of small businesses in a local community, including the support of
the cultural and civic needs of the community. The salary allows for long-range plan-
ning and participation." Id. at 5, para. T.5. The British and Canadian groups propose a
similar, but simpler and perhaps more modest standard. Omitting reference to sustain-
able community and without special mention of women, they propose that companies
pay "adequate compensation which enables employees to both meet the needs of them-
selves and their families and provide discretionary income." Id. principle 3.2.P.3, at 9.
104. Sullivan Principles, supra note 42, at 1497. See also ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC.,
SEVENTEENTH REPORT ON THE SIGNATORY COMPANIES TO THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
FOR SOUTH AFRICA 13 (1993).
Because there is no national minimum wage, this program uses two minimum
economic living level wages determined annually by two universities ....
However, because the minimum economic levels are at the subsistence level,
Signatories are required to pay a premium of at least 30 percent [above the
minima]. The lowest-paid employee received, on average, 94 percent above
[the minima] ....
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2. Directly Supporting the Repressive Activities of a Repressive
Regime
One area where the responsibilities of corporations would
seem clear is where the corporation directly supports the repres-
sive activities of the forces violating human rights. Who supplied
General Abacha with the noose to hang Ken Saro-Wiwa? An-
other example is when Polaroid supplied the film for the photo
identification cards that South African security forces used to
keep blacks in their place under apartheid.1"5 In cases like
these, multinationals have a responsibility not to be complicit.
3. Supporting the Non-Repressive Activities of a Repressive
Regime
Shell's natural gas plant in Nigeria may, by itself, be harm-
less or even beneficial to Nigerians. On the other hand, it may
help General Abacha to retain power longer. In cases like these,
whether to do business at all in a pervasively repressive country,
the level of responsibility for the corporation depends on the
circumstances. One factor, as noted by the Interfaith Center on
Corporate Responsibility, is whether there exists a strong indige-
nous movement calling for divestment." 6 In South Africa there
was, whereas in Northern Ireland there is not.
4. Corporate Advocacy on Issues Related to Its Operations
Shell should have spoken up sooner and more forcefully
against the show trial of Ken Saro-Wiwa, just as The Gap ulti-
mately spoke out against its Salvadoran contractor and on the
Salvadoran Government. As the New York Times recently editori-
alized, "Shell, surely, has never hesitated to use its influence on
matters of Nigerian tax policy, environmental rules, labor laws
and trade policies.""0 7 Why make an exception for human rights
violations closely connected to the company's operations?
5. Corporate Advocacy on Issues Not Directly Related to Its
Operations
At first blush, this may seem to exceed the proper bounds
for a multinational enterprise. But consider the Sullivan Princi-
105. Arnold & Hammond, supra note 43, at 121.
106. Interfaith Center, supra note 78, art. 2.3.P.1., at 8.
107. Shell Game in Nigeria, supra note 5, at 14.
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ples, which called on U.S. firms to "Support the ending of all
Apartheid laws."' 08 Under this mandate, the U.S. Corporate
Council for Change in South Africa, in 1985, published adver-
tisements in the Johannesburg Press calling for the abolition of ra-
cial discrimination. 0 9 The more serious and widespread the vio-
lations, the stronger the case for multinationals to condemn
them.
CONCLUSION
The eve of the twenty-first century is marked by economic
globalization, expansion in the number of free enterprise econo-
mies, and by privatization. As responsibilities thus shift from the
public to the private sector and especially to multinationals, gov-
ernments and intergovernmental organizations wield corre-
spondingly less power. Even where governments have the polit-
ical will, they may lack effective power to safeguard basic rights, a
power which increasingly, for an important spectrum of rights,
rests in the private hands of multinational corporations.
Whether incipient trends in corporate responsibility will ripen
into a second human rights revolution remains to be seen. But
in view of the impressive and growing power of multinational
enterprises to affect basic rights, human rights advocates would
do well to monitor and nurture these developments. Executives
of multinationals, for their part, might reflect upon whether
along with their expanding reach and influence comes added
responsibilities.
108. Sullivan Principles, supra note 42, Principle VI.
109. Arnold & Hammond, supra note 43, at 116.
